The Institutionalization of Torture under the Bush Administration by Bassiouni, M. Cherif
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 37 | Issue 2
2006
The Institutionalization of Torture under the Bush
Administration
M. Cherif Bassiouni
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture under the Bush Administration, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 389 (2006)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/14
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION
M CherifBassiouni t
"In this decisive year, you and I will make choices that determine both the
future and the character of our country.... We will renew the defining
moral commitments of this land."
- President George W. Bush
State of the Union Address,
January 31, 2006
INTRODUCTION
The institutionalization of torture became a reality when President
Bush authorized the establishment of Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, concluded that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to combatants
seized in Afghanistan (Taliban and Al Qaeda), approved the use of "en-
hanced interrogation techniques," issued an Executive Order that bypassed
Congress, and unilaterally established a new parallel system of justice to
deal with "terrorists" through Military Commissions.2 The above actions
were further compounded by the interrogation regulations issued by the
Secretary of Defense and the procedures he issued in connection with the
I Distinguished Research Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law
Institute, DePaul University College of Law.
1 George W. Bush, Report on the State of the Union (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Bush,
State of the Union Address].
2 Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001). See also Jordan J. Paust, War
and Enemy Status After 9/11: Attacks on the Laws of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325 (2003)
[hereinafter Paust, War and Enemy Status]; Steven W. Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall.
. .": Assessing the Aftermath of September 11th, 37 VAL. U. L. REv. 563, 580-92 (2003)
(describing President Bush's Military Order in detail and arguing that it is ultra vires because
it was issued without Congress first formally declaring war). Arguing that "a common plan
to violate customary and treaty-based international law concerning the treatment and interro-
gation of so-called 'terrorists' and enemy combatant detainees and their supporters captured
during the U.S. war in Afghanistan emerged within the Bush Administration in 2002." See
Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005) [hereinafter Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations].
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Military Commissions at Guantanamo.3 Subsequently the President, the
Vice President, and the Secretary of Defense made several official state-
ments on the need for U.S. interrogators to obtain "results," thus creating a
top-down command influence leading subordinates to commit torture, while
their superiors felt compelled to look the other way. The practices that fol-
lowed this policy have resulted to date in the estimated deaths of over 200
detainees in U.S. custody, presumably as a result of torture; 4 probably as
many as several thousand persons have been tortured during interrogation at
U.S.-controlled detention facilities and at foreign detention facilities where
officials acting for and on behalf of the U.S. have engaged in torture. What
is known about these policies and practices has been disclosed through the
media, Pentagon documents released under the Freedom of Information Act,
some autopsy reports, a few investigations and courts martial, and a few
officers' statements, which together offer only a glimpse of what may have
actually taken place.5
The U.S., pursuant to Article 19 of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"),
submitted on June 29, 2005 a report to the Committee Against Torture.6 In
that report, the position of the U.S. is an expression of conformity with the
provisions of the Convention.7 The official position of the U.S. as expressed
in that report, contains the following relevant statements:
3 For a collection of the orders and directives, see THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenburg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE
PAPERS].
4 Different numbers have surfaced in various media sources. Human Rights Watch re-
cently reported that "[a]t least eighty-six detainees have died in U.S. custody since 2002, and
the U.S. government has admitted that at least twenty-seven of these cases were criminal
homicides." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 504 (2006), http://hrw.org/wr2k6/wr20
06.pdf. Furthermore, of the 98 deaths arising out of interrogations, including allegations of
torture, only 12 resulted in punishment. Hina Shamsi, Command Responsibility: Detainee
Deaths in U.S. Custody in Iraq and Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST REPORT 103 (Feb.
2006).
5 See LILA RAJIVA, THE LANGUAGE OF EMPIRE: ABU GHRAIB AND THE AMERICAN MEDIA
11-19,35-54 (2005); MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE
WAR ON TERROR (2004); SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO
ABU GHRAIB (2004); ERIK SAAR & VIVECA NOVAK, INSIDE THE WIRE: A MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE SOLDIER'S EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF LIFE AT GUANTANAMO (2005). See also
Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2085 (2005).
6 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 19, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; U.N. Comm.
Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the
Convention, Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/48/Add.3 (June 29, 2005), available at http://hei.unige.ch/-clapham/hrdoc/docs/US
CATreport2005.pdf [hereinafter Article 19 Reports].
7 See Article 19 Reports, supra note 6.
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In fighting terrorism, the U.S. remains committed to respecting the rule of
law, including the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and international
treaty obligations, including the Torture Convention.8
The President of the United States has made clear that the United
States stands against and will not tolerate torture under any circumstances..
. [T]he President confirmed the continued importance of these protections
and of U.S. obligations under the Torture Convention, stating:
[T]he United States reaffirms its commitment to the worldwide elimination
of torture .... To help fulfill this commitment, the U.S. has joined 135
other nations in ratifying the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. America stands against
and will not tolerate torture. We will investigate and prosecute all acts of
torture and undertake to prevent other cruel and unusual punishment in all
territory under our jurisdiction .... 9
The report goes on to further emphasize the position of the U.S., af-
firming its obligations under CAT and the applicability of the CAT to U.S.
Armed Forces in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, reiterating legal
obligations under the United States Constitution and U.S. laws, including
awareness of the need to apply both the CAT and U.S. legislation extraterri-
torially, and investigating and prosecuting violations.' 0
What is described above is either a deliberate attempt on the part of
the Administration to mislead the U.N. Committee Against Torture as well
as the 135 member states, or it represents a case of political schizophrenia
where one side of the Administration is telling the world that it is in con-
formity with its international obligations, which it well understands, while
another side of the same Administration takes the opposite position.
How has a nation dedicated to the upholding of its constitution and
to the rule of law and that has been the world's leader in championing inter-
national human rights protection come to institutionalize torture? How has a
constitutional system of government that offers itself to the world as a
model lost its ability to maintain "checks and balances" and effective over-
sight over abuses of law by the Executive Branch? Why is it that the Ameri-
can people have remained muted in their indignation against the commis-
sion of crimes under international law as well as U.S. law?"
8 Id. 4.
9 Id. 5 (citing George W. Bush, Statement on the United Nations International Day in
Support of Victims of Torture (June 26, 2004)).
'0 Id. 19, 51.
1 On the question of the state of American values in foreign affairs, see JIMMY CARTER,
OUR ENDANGERED VALUES: AMERICA'S MORAL CRISIS (2005). See also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Great Nations and Torture, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 256 (Karen J. Greenberg
ed., 2006) (discussing the United States' failure to live up to its status as a "great nation" in
2006]
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The day may come when these disturbing questions will be an-
swered. For now, we must establish a record that may be useful in the future
or, at the very least, to remind us not to repeat the same mistakes.
THE PROHIBITION OF TORTURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
For over half a century, the U.S. led the effort to prohibit torture
under international law. The U.S. was the most active supporter in the draft-
ing and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
in 1948, whose Article 5 contains a prohibition against "[C]ruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."' 12 The UDHR was subsequently recog-
nized as part of customary international law. The U.S. then led the efforts at
the United Nations for the adoption in 1966 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), whose Article 7 contains the same
prohibition as that included in Article 5 of the UDHR. 13 Thereafter, the U.S.
was a strong supporter of CAT, which was adopted by the United Nations in
1984.14
During the period of time between 1948 and 1984, the U.S. was in
the forefront of international efforts to eliminate the practice of torture in
countries whose governments still resorted to such a barbaric practice.
Thereafter, the U.S. monitored such prohibited practices and denounced
them consistently in the congressionally mandated Department of State's
Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Torture is not only proscribed by the CAT-it has long been pro-
hibited under international humanitarian law, beginning with the 1899
Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 15 subse-
quently amended by the 1907 Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, which is still in effect to date. 16 It also became a war crime
under conventional international humanitarian law with its embodiment in
this area) [hereinafter THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA]. To understand why America is
undergoing a moral crisis, see CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM,
SECRECY, AND THE END OF THE REPUBLIC (2004), and DAVID HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM
(2003).
12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. H/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948).
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171.
14 CAT, supra note 6.
15 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 4, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 129 (Supp. 1907).
16 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 4, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (Supp. 1908) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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the 1929 Geneva Convention Relating to the Prisoners of War, 17 the Four
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,18 and the two 1977 Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.19
Torture is therefore an international crime under customary and
conventional international humanitarian law and international human rights
law, and its prohibition applies in times of war and in times of peace. There
are no exceptions.
Since the adoption of the CAT and as a result of international moni-
toring, such as the U.N. Committee Against Torture established under the
CAT, and national monitoring, undertaken by individual states such as the
U.S., torture has never been openly acknowledged by governments that
have secretly engaged in such a practice. The exception has been the im-
plicit institutionalization of torture, which was publicly described in various
legal memos as permissible interrogation techniques, a euphemism for tor-
ture.20 This policy and the ensuing practices which have been publicly dis-
closed are in violation of: the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
which prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment"; 21 the
CAT, which the U.S. ratified;22 the 1907 Hague Convention on the Laws
and Customs of War on Land, which is binding on the U.S.; 2 3 the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions, which the U.S. ratified;24 the Uniform Code of Military
17 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, July 27, 1929
47 Stat. 2021, reprinted in 27 AM J. INT'L L. 63 (Supp. 1933).
18 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
19 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470?OpenDocument; Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, available at
http://icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/475?OpenDocument.
20 See supra notes 2-3.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. For an enlightened commentary on the Administration's
double standards, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003); see generally THE TORTURE
DEBATE IN AMERICA, supra note 11.
22 See CAT, supra note 6.
23 Hague Convention, supra note 16.
24 Geneva I, supra note 18; Geneva II, supra note 18; Geneva III, supra note 18; Geneva
IV, supra note 18.
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Justice ("UCMJ"), which in its war crimes provision, as well as in other
provisions, prohibits torture by U.S. military personnel and those to whom
the UCMJ applies;25 Title 18 Section 2340, which incorporates the provi-
sions of the CAT in U.S. criminal law;26 and, the Torture Victim Protection
Act, which provides for a civil remedy under the CAT.27
Article 1 of the CAT defines torture as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suf-
fering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 28
Article 16 of the CAT is in the nature of a catch-all provision to
make sure that anything that does not fall within the meaning of torture is
covered by the meaning of "other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment. ' ' 29 It states:
Each state party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its juris-
diction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are
committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.30
25 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000).
26 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000).
27 Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
28 See CAT, supra note 6, at art. 1. Many of the issues involving severe pain and suffering
(whether done by a public official or not and the manner in which it is done, etc.) have been
addressed in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights, both of which prohibit torture, the European Con-
vention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
as well as in a number of cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-
American Court of Human rights, as well as in criminal and civil cases before U.S. Federal
District Courts. See GAIL H. MILLER, DEFINING TORTuRE (2005).
29 CAT, supra note 6, at art. 16.
30 Id. This provision particularly applies to the practices of extraordinary rendition de-
scribed below, since even if the government or its relevant agency in this case, the CIA,
claims that it did not directly engage in torture, nor specifically know that torture would be
carried out on the kidnapped person, they had the legal obligation not to subject such persons
to what they had to have known would constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. It is noteworthy that in those countries to which the U.S. delivered kidnapped
persons for interrogation such as Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, and Indonesia, among those coun-
tries reported, that these countries do not have national legislation implementing the CAT,
[Vol. 37:389
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Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War states spe-
cifically that, "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coer-
cion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war ....
The prohibition against the infliction of any pain or suffering is ab-
solute and categorical under the Third Geneva Convention and is also so
intended by the CAT, though the latter modified "pain and suffering" with
the term "severe," which is not included in the Third Geneva Convention.
Because human beings have different thresholds for the tolerance of pain
and anguish, the drafters of the CAT were intent on not allowing a loophole
in defining pain or suffering that could be exploited by potential torturers.
The term "severe" was added simply to distinguish physical contacts of the
sort that are sometimes encountered in ordinary arrests. 32
nor do they have national laws defining what constitutes torture. Therefore, the Administra-
tion's deniability of knowledge is on its face implausible. None of the memoranda by the
government lawyers referred to the 9th Circuit's decision holding that a sufficient nexus
must exist between the U.S. officials and the acts of torture committed by foreign officials.
Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004); Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1194
(9th Cir. 2003); Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2002). Interest-
ingly, the Court in Zheng cited a U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report which
supports that proposition. Zheng, 332 F.3d at 1195 (citing S. ExEc. REP. No. 101-30, at 9
(1990)). This was also confirmed in Ontunez-Tursios. Ontunez-Tursios. 303 F.3d at 355.
31 Geneva III, supra note 18, at art. 17. See also Paust, Executive Plans and Authoriza-
tions, supra note 2 (describing the prohibition of torture under international humanitarian law
and arguing a "common plan" by the Administration to intentionally commit these viola-
tions).
32 On the history and application of the CAT, see J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS,
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
(1988); Jost L. DE LA CUESTA ARZAMENDI, EL DELITO DE TORTURA (1990); Daniel H. Derby,
Torture, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 705 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999);
Daniel H. Derby, The Prevention and Suppression of Torture, in 48 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
DE DROIT PENAL (1977); NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999).
As the co-chair of the Drafting Committee which prepared the first text of the Torture Con-
vention, I can attest to what is stated in the text to which this note applies. See U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. On the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Draft Convention for the Prevention and Suppression of Torture, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/NGO/213 (February 1, 1978) (prepared by the International Association of Penal
Law).
The issue arose first before the European Court of Human Rights in The Republic of Ireland
v. The United Kingdom, as to whether the distinction between torture and inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment was based on the severity of the pain and suffering, as well as the type of
treatment to which the detainee was subjected. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1978).
2006]
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. POLICY SUPPORTING TORTURE AND THE
PRACTICES THAT FOLLOWED THEREFROM
The institutionalization of the crime of torture began when the civil-
ian leadership of the Department of Defense bypassed the Judge Advocates
General of the various branches of the military, as well as non-lawyer senior
military officers, whose understanding of the law and sense of honor made
them oppose such practices by the U.S. military. Surely, these honorable
men and women in uniform who opposed torture also considered the conse-
quences of such practices in terms of reciprocal treatment by enemies of the
United States against its military personnel, even if such reprisals are pro-
hibited under international humanitarian law. With the military lawyers and
others removed from all deliberations and responsibilities, civilian lawyers
in the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the White
House proceeded to use their legal talent to subvert the law. In so doing,
they undermined the ethics of the legal profession and violated the U.S.
Constitution and the laws of the U.S., which they were sworn to uphold.
Such legal advisors, including Jay S. Bybee (Assistant Attorney General
and now federal judge), Alberto Gonzalez (White House Counsel and now
Attorney General), William J. Haynes II (General Counsel, Department of
Defense, and nominated for a federal judgeship), and John Yoo (Deputy
Assistant Attorney General and now a professor at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley), used their talents to justify highly questionable posi-
tions.33 These legal opinions and other government memoranda were
33 The legal opinions and other government memoranda prepared by these legal advisors
appear in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3. See e.g., Memorandum from John C. Yoo,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Defense, Application of Treaties and
Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 3, at 38-79 [Yoo/Delahunty Memo]; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and
William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note
3, at 81; Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to George W.
Bush, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Con-
flict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra
note 3, at 118-21; Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interro-
gation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), reprinted THE TORTURE PAPERS,
supra note 3 at 172-217 [hereinafter Bybee Memo]; Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., Official of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3, at 218-22 (regard-
ing "the views of our Office concerning the legality, under international law, of interrogation
methods to be used .... on captured al Qaeda operatives."); Memorandum from William J.
Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def. to Donald Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., U.S. Dep't
of Def., Counter-resistance Techniques (Nov. 27, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS,
[Vol. 37:389
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drafted and presented in order to allow the Administration's leaders to es-
tablish a policy that these legal advisors knew or should have known was in
violation of U.S. and international law.34 In an effort to deflect moral and
legal opposition, these legal advisers attempted to walk the narrow path that
tax lawyers identify as the difference between tax avoidance and tax eva-
sion, the former being legal, and the latter being illegal. At some point argu-
ing that the definition of torture should be reconstructed in a way that per-
mits acts that have otherwise been considered torture, and arguing that the
laws of armed conflict do not apply to certain combatants, or that the Ge-
neva conventions do not apply, crossed the line from avoidance to evasion.
supra note 3 at 237; Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of
Def. to Mary L. Walker, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of the Air Force, Working Group to Assess
(Interrogation Issues) (Jan. 17, 2003), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3 at
240. It should be noted that the Bybee memo was disregarded by the Administration because
it was so obviously flawed and in contradiction with Article 1 of CAT and with Title 18
U.S.C. § 2340. See CAT, supra note 6, at art. 1. An amended position was developed in the
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Regarding Legal Standards
Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Dec. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf. In the end, the Bybee and Yoo memoranda are the
ones that can be at best described as the most outrageous stretching of the law to a point
where it is very difficult to assume that they were acting as reasonable jurists in a good faith
search of the law. The authors of the various government memos, particularly the Yoo and
Levin memos, dealt with the question of the severity of torture-the first two twisting the
meaning of the words beyond recognition. They and others preceding them also interpreted
the words in Article 1 of the CAT, "intentional infliction" as requiring specific intent, thus
making it more difficult to prove. Interestingly, however, they ignored existing jurisprudence
on this subject, such as the Third Circuit's interpretation of the CAT's mental element re-
quirement as not being specific intent. See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473 (3d Cir.
2003); see also Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 144 (3d Cir. 2005). Bybee's position was
broader in that it set aside U.S. obligations under international law while ignoring those
under U.S. law. More senior government officials, including the President, relied on these
memoranda and issued their own directives. See Memorandum from Donald Rumsfeld,
Sec'y of Def., Dep't of Def. to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Status of Taliban and
Al Qaeda (Jan. 19, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3, at 80; Letter from
John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice to George W. Bush, President (Feb. 1,
2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3, at 126-27 (discussing the Justice
Department's position on why the Geneva Convention did not apply to al Qaeda and Taliban
detainees); Memorandum from George W. Bush, President to Dick Cheney, Vice President,
et al, Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3 at 134; U.S. Dep't of Def., Military Commission Order No. 1:
Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/
usapatriot/02032 I militaryregs.pdf.
34 For a comprehensive analysis of these and other official U.S. documents, see Evan J.
Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny Application of the Third Geneva
Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib,
36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541 (2004).
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Having crossed that line, questions go to criminal responsibility35 and ethi-
cal breaches.36
The pictures of Abu Ghraib and others are a stark reminder of the
type of practices that were carried out and exemplify the types of actions
that indisputably fall within the prohibition of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, as well as the definition of and prohibition against torture found in the
CAT and also in U.S. law. 37 Tragically, over 200 persons have been re-
35 It should be noted that the jurisprudence of the U.S., particularly with respect to white
collar crimes, establishes the criminal responsibility of attorneys for conspiracy. It also pre-
cludes reliance by clients on patently wrong advice given by attorneys to be used as a shield
from criminal responsibility. Attorneys are also responsible and subject to disciplinary sanc-
tions in every state for breach of the canons of ethics. See generally DONALD NICOLSON &
JULIAN WEBB, PROFESSIONAL LEGAL ETHICS: CRITICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1999); Barry Sulli-
van, Professions of Law, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1235 (1996); Jim Edwards, Answering
Ashcroft's Challenge: Lawyers for 9-11 Detainees Meet to Consider Coordinated Strategy,
166 NEW JERSEY L.J. 961 (2001).
36 As defined inter alia in the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct: "A lawyer...
is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having spe-
cial responsibility for the quality of justice." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1
(2004) (emphasis added).
37 On February 15, 2006, additional photos of abuse at Abu Ghraib were released by Aus-
tralia's Special Broadcasting Service. See Robert H. Reid, More Photos Emerge of Abuse,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 2006; Erich Follath et al., America's Shame: Torture in the Name of
Freedom, SPIEGEL, Feb. 20, 2006.
They are photos that make your blood run cold. They take your breath away. They
turn your stomach. They are photos that make you wonder what kinds of human
beings would do these things to other human beings. They trigger anger, disgust
and shame.
One photo shows a prisoner being sandwiched between two stretchers, like some
perverse ad for a burger. In another, a disoriented detainee, his body smeared with
an unidentified substance, stumbles down a prison corridor. A third image depicts a
hooded man waiting helplessly on a stool, with electric cables attached to his body.
There are many more-and they all show prisoners being deliberately humiliated
for their captors' amusement, men stripped naked and forced into submission. But
it's not just humiliation-the photos also depict physical pain. In one photo, an
American soldier kneels on the back of a naked Iraqi prisoner, a puddle of blood
indicating rough treatment. In another, a prisoner bows deeply, servant-like, in
front of an American military officer: Uncle Tom's Cabin in the Middle East.
The crimes committed by US soldiers in the name of freedom and human rights,
documented in unalterable photographs, appear to confirm the suspicion that
America's true aim is something entirely different-that the US is primarily inter-
ested in imposing its own world order and preserving its dominance.
In short, for the United States, the most powerful and influential global power ever,
the images from Abu Ghraib-and the ongoing debate over the legality of its
prison camp at Guantanamo-have produced a moral catastrophe that's likely to
endure for a very long time.
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ported to have died in U.S. custody as a result of interrogation techniques
ensuing from the policy and practices approved by the government lawyers
working for the Administration.38 Among some examples that may illustrate
what was deemed permissible and which were actually carried out are: forc-
ing a father to watch the mock execution of his 14-year old son; placing a lit
cigarette in the ear of a detainee to bum his eardrum; bathing a person's
hand in alcohol and then lighting it on fire; shackling persons to the floor
for 18-24 hours; shackling persons from the top of a door frame to dislocate
the shoulders, and gagging persons in order to create the effect of drowning
in one's own saliva; "waterboarding," which is placing a cloth on a person's
head and dousing it with water to create the effect of drowning; forcing a
person to squat for periods up to and beyond 24 hours; crushing a person's
bare hands and feet with boots, producing bleeding and severe hematoma;
inflicting beatings with bare knuckles and hard objects, producing broken
bones and lacerations; beating heads against walls; striking with the knees
and boots in body locations known to cause severe pain and suffering; with-
holding medical treatment of the injured; and so on. 39
These practices sanctioned by the Administration are exactly what
Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention prohibits, and what the CAT
drafters of Article 1 wanted to avoid. The Administration's legal advisors
preposterously claimed that the infliction of severe pain and suffering, as
defined in Article 1 of the CAT, "[M]ust be equivalent in intensity to the
pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impair-
ment of bodily function, or even death" in order to constitute torture. 40 With
respect to psychological techniques, Bybee argued that psychological harm
38 For a review of these documents, see THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3. For an analy-
sis of these documents, see Wallach, supra note 34. For reports on the torture victims and
investigative outcomes, see Shamsi, supra note 4.
39 Many accounts in the media, as well as the official reports released under the Freedom
of Information Act request of Human Rights First and the ACLU, describe these and other
practices. See e.g. Shamsi, supra note 4; Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to
Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006.
Qahtani had been subjected to a hundred and sixty days of isolation in a pen per-
petually flooded with artificial light. He was interrogated on forty-eight of fifty-
four days, for eighteen to twenty hours at a stretch. He had been stripped naked;
straddled by taunting female guards, in an exercise called "invasion of space by a
female"; forced to wear women's underwear on his head, and to put on a bra;
threatened by dogs; placed on a leash; and told that his mother was a whore. By
December, Qahtani had been subjected to a phony kidnapping, deprived of heat,
given large quantities of intravenous liquids without access to a toilet, and deprived
of sleep for three days. Ten days before Brant and Mora met, Qahtani's heart rate
had dropped so precipitately, to thirty-five beats a minute, that he required cardiac
monitoring.
Id.
40 See Bybee Memo, supra note 33, at 172.
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41
must last "months or even years," to constitute torture. Moreover, they
argued that the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitar-
ian law did not apply to combatants who fought the U.S. when it attacked
Afghanistan,42 even though an explicit Department of Defense directive
dating back to 1979 requires that the United States Armed Forces "shall
comply with the law of war in the conduct of military operations and related
activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are recognized., 43 Con-
sequently, combatants who fought for the Taliban were arbitrarily deemed
not to benefit from the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, in direct contradiction to Article 5 of that Geneva Con-
vention. 44 These legal constructions by competent government lawyers,
who knew that the JAG lawyers and others deemed them in contradiction to
international humanitarian law and to U.S. law, raise serious questions
about their legal and ethical responsibility.
This is not new in history. The Subsequent Proceedings held at
Nuremberg in The Justice Case made clear that jurists must uphold their
moral, ethical, and legal obligations and must not allow their efforts to serve
as a shield for the commission of crimes. 45 The movie Judgment at Nurem-
41 id.
42 Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 33.
43 Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program, para.
E(1)(a)(10) (July 10, 1979). The same requirements are also included in U.S. DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATIONS, FIELD MANUAL 34-52 (1992). For a scholarly and
expert description of the Geneva Conventions' applicability and the Administration's plain
error, see Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503 (2003); Paust, War and Enemy Status,
supra note 2.
44 Yoo/Delahunty Memo, supra note 33; Geneva III, supra note 18, at art. 5; Article 5 of
the CAT states:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its ju-
risdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or
on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appro-
priate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to estab-
lish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is pre-
sent in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to
article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accor-
dance with internal law.
CAT, supra note 6, art. 5.
45 United States v. Altstoetter (The Justice Case), in 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 1063-81
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berg popularized these proceedings and presented Spencer Tracy playing
the role of the Iowa judge confronting otherwise distinguished and learned
German judges and jurists charged with conspiring and aiding and abetting
in the commission of "crimes against humanity., 46 The American judge
from Iowa was bewildered and perplexed as to how it was possible for such
distinguished German jurists to sidestep the law and overlook their moral,
ethical, and legal obligations in order to do the bidding of a repressive re-
gime. 47 Was career advancement that much of an inducement? Was ambi-
tion that powerful? Were their consciences that flawed? Was their regime so
wicked and vengeful that they dared not oppose its morally and legally
wrongful wishes? Was intimidation so pervasive that no one dared to op-
pose?
48
Standards for the conduct of medical and healthcare professionals in
the context of military service were similarly established during the trials of
Nazi doctors following World War I1.49 These ethical, professional, and
legal guidelines prohibited doctors and nurses from aiding and abetting in
torture. Just as military lawyers in the U.S. have opposed the practice of
(1951) [hereinafter The Justice Case]. As described by one scholar, a former JAG officer,
"not since the Nazi era have so many lawyers been so clearly involved in international crime
concerning the treatment and interrogation of persons detained during war." Paust, Executive
Plans and Authorizations, supra note 2 at 811.
46 JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. 1961).
47 Id.
48 In the movie Judgment at Nuremberg Spencer Tracy's character says while rendering
his judgment from the Bench:
[The Defendant's] record and his fate illuminate the most shattering truth that has
emerged from this trial. If he and all of the other defendants had been degraded
perverts; if all of the leaders of the Third Reich had been sadistic monsters, then
these events would have no more moral significance than an earthquake or any
other natural catastrophe. But this trial has shown that under a national crisis, ordi-
nary, even able and extraordinary men, can delude themselves into the commission
of crimes so vast and heinous that they beggar the imagination. How easily it can
happen. There are those in our own country too that today speak of the protection
of country, of survival. A decision must be made in the life of every nation, at the
very moment when the grasp of the enemy is at its throat; then it seems that the
only way to survive is to use the means of the enemy, to wrest survival on what is
expedient, to look the other way. Only, the answer to that is survival as what? A
country isn't a rock; it's not an extension of one's self. It's what it stands for. It's
what it stands for when standing for something is the most difficult.
Id. I am indebted to Professor Michael Scharf for this quote.
49 U.S. v. Brandt (The Medical Case), in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 171-297 (1947);
see also THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992); ROBERT JAY LIFTON,
THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1986).
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torture within the context of the Department of Defense, 50 U.S. military
5o As reported by Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006 at 35, a
number of government lawyers "fought a quiet battle" and "paid a price for it". They include
James Comey, Deputy Attorney General, and former Acting Attorney General and Jack
Goldsmith, former Assistant Attorney General, who at that time that he was the head of the
Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel was able to have the Yoo memorandum
changed by Daniel Levin. While at the White House, the former NSC Legal Advisor John
Bellinger (now Legal Advisor, Department of State) also took a position against denying the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the Guantanamo detainees. Goldsmith was also
supported by Patrick Philbin, who worked with the Attorney General. The Newsweek story
also reveals the manipulative interventions of David Addington, former General Counsel for
the Department of Defense and former Counsel for Vice President Cheney, now his Chief of
Staff. Id. Apparently it was Addington who bypassed the JAG officers, as well as used Yoo,
to obtain the legal opinion justifying torture. Comey and Goldsmith have since been pushed
out of their positions by Addington. As explained by Lea Anne McBride, a spokesman for
Vice President Cheney, "This administration is united in its commitment to protect Ameri-
cans, defeat terrorism, and grow democracy," meaning that honest and legitimate dissenting
views are not permitted. Id. at 36. She further adds about Addington, "[H]e's committed to
the President's agenda," meaning both the Vice President and the President have an agenda
on the subject which Addington carried out irrespective of the legality involved, and notwith-
standing any contrary legal opinions which were either sidestepped or brushed aside. Id. at
37. Jane Mayer chronicles the extraordinary story of Alberto J. Mora, General Counsel of the
Navy, who opposed the torture policy. Mayer, supra note 39. In Mora's detailed declassified
memorandum he shows how "enhanced interrogation techniques" skirting the CAT and
Geneva legal limitations was a policy pushed by Addington and his former subordinate Wil-
liam Haynes, then General Counsel for the Department of Defense. Memorandum from
Alberto J. Mora, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of the Navy to Vice Admiral Albert Church,
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of the Navy, Statement for the Record: Office of General Counsel
Involvement in Interrogation Issues (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter Mora Memo].
The memo is a chronological account, submitted on July 7, 2004, to Vice Admiral
Albert Church, who led a Pentagon investigation into abuses at the U.S. detention
facility at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. It reveals that Mora's criticisms of Administra-
tion policy were unequivocal, wide-ranging, and persistent. Well before the expo-
sure of prisoner abuse in Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison, in April, 2004, Morn warned
his superiors at the Pentagon about the consequences of President Bush's decision,
in February, 2002, to circumvent the Geneva conventions, which prohibit both tor-
ture and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment." He argued that a refusal to outlaw cruelty toward U.S.-held terrorist
suspects was an implicit invitation to abuse. Morn also challenged the legal frame-
work that the Bush Administration has constructed to justify an expansion of ex-
ecutive power, in matters ranging from interrogations to wiretapping. He described
as "unlawful," "dangerous," and "erroneous" novel legal theories granting the
President the right to authorize abuse. Mora warned that these precepts could leave
U.S. personnel open to criminal prosecution.
.. Top Administration officials have stressed that the interrogation policy was re-
viewed and sanctioned by government lawyers; last November, President Bush
said, "Any activity we conduct is within the law. We do not torture." Mora's
memo, however, shows that almost from the start of the Administration's war on
terror the White House, the Justice Department, and the Department of Defense,
intent upon having greater flexibility, charted a legally questionable course despite
sustained objections from some of its own lawyers.
[Vol. 37:389
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF TORTURE
doctors have also upheld their professional oaths by signing death certifi-
cates evidencing torture as the cause of death when such instances have
arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq. 51 To their credit, these and other members of
the military are the heroes of this tragic episode in our contemporary his-
tory. Regrettably, many others have turned a blind eye, looked the other
way, and violated their oath by going along with the political wishes of the
Pentagon's civilian leadership.
The government lawyers whose work product is mentioned above
did so to allow their clients to rely on their advice, and thus eventually avoid
responsibility. These clients are primarily: President George W. Bush, Vice
President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and former
Attorney General John Ashcroft. One day, perhaps, if this is ever brought to
the bar of justice, judges will probably ask the same questions as the Iowa
judge portrayed by Spencer Tracy. They will likely ask these government
lawyers such questions as: were they experts on the subjects on which they
opined; did they ask the advice of other experts; did they submit their advice
to expert input or critique; did they assess any margin of error or apprecia-
tion between their views and those of others; could jurists of average, not to
say superior, intellectual capabilities have reached in good faith the same
conclusions that these government lawyers reached in their legal opinions?
Surely it will not be easy to prove that they acted with "malice afore-
thought," as the Common Law calls it, or specific intent, as some crimes
under the UCMJ and Title 18 require.52 But general intent based on the
standard of the reasonable lawyer in like circumstances? Considering also
that they are more than average lawyers as one because a federal judge,
another one awaits Senate confirmation for a federal judgeship and one is a
University professor at a prestigious law school. Moreover, how much of a
defense will their opinions be for the senior officials who solicited that ad-
vice and pressed for it, particularly if it was clear that this was the outcome
they sought? Will these senior officials be able to hide behind such thinly
transparent legal opinions?
The military, all the way through the chain of command, will also
have to face similar legal questions but with the difference that under both
the laws of armed conflict and the UCMJ they have the duty to refuse to
Mayer, supra note 39.
Once again reminiscing on The Justice Case, the judgment exonerated four jurists who had
the courage of taking a different path. If the time ever comes to judge the government law-
yers mentioned above and elsewhere in this article, there will surely be those who stood out
for their intellectual and professional integrity in the face of their superiors' political pres-
sures. The Justice Case, supra note 45.
51 See supra notes 4-5.
52 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000).
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obey an order that is "manifestly unlawful. 53 Their defense counsels, like
those of the senior administration officials, will argue that the orders their
clients' followed were not manifestly unlawful and that these military per-
sonnel could reasonably rely on the legal opinions of such government law-
yers as those mentioned above.
As more pieces of the jigsaw puzzle are discovered over time,
transparent arguments will be difficult to maintain. If nothing else, the con-
sistent elimination of the Judge Advocate General officers from the process
of shaping the governing legal opinions will weigh heavily against those
who will seek to use the fig leaf defense of the Administration's talented
civilian lawyers' legal memoranda. Another factor will be the reports of
general officers' investigations of Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and Guantanamo,
which have so far been classified, as well as other internal reports and
memoranda by military officers, Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") offi-
cers and staffers, and Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents, some
of which decried or denounced interrogation practices, while others raised
questions about their utility and highlighted their counter-productivity.
Like many Judge Advocate General ("JAG") officers and other of-
ficers who disapproved of the policy and practices of torture, some senior
officials, including then Secretary of State Colin Powell, probably because
of his military background, raised serious questions about the various legal
53 For history of command responsibility, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 423-447 (1992) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI,
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY; see also Major William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for
War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1973). Linda A. Malone, The Kahan Report, Ariel Sharon,
and the Sabra-Shatila Massacres in Lebanon: Responsibility Under International Law for
Massacres of Civilian Populations, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 373 (1985); Shamsi, supra note 4.
Article 28 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court establishes the responsibility of
commanders and other superiors. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Final Act
of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9 (July 1, 2002). For the legislative
history of the ICC, see 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2005). For the non-applicability of the defense of "obedience to
superior orders," see BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 53, at 449-83. It
must be noted that the defense of "obedience to superior orders" was rejected in Article 7 of
the IMT's charter and Article 6 of the IMTFE's charter, but it can be considered in mitiga-
tion of punishment. See generally, Nico KEIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE (1978); LESLIE C.
GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976); YORAM DINSTEN,
THE DEFENSE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965);
EKKEHART MOLLER-RAPPARD, L'ORDER SUPERIEUR MILITAIRE ET LA RESPONSIBILITE DU
SUBORDNNE (1965); Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, in 1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 223 (1999). It was also specifically eliminated in the statutes
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Tribu-
nal for Rwanda. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C Res. 955, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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memoranda and the push from the top in the direction of torture.54 Other
government lawyers including Alberto Mora, General Counsel for the De-
partment of the Navy 55 and William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor to the De-
partment of State, also opposed these legal propositions. 56 All these critical
opinions were set aside. Last but not least, a number of honorable former
JAG officers, led by Navy JAG Admiral John Hutson, filed an amicus cu-
riae brief with the Supreme Court of the United States in Rasul v. Bush
57
arguing in opposition to the President's Executive Order establishing Mili-
tary Commissions to prosecute the Guantanamo detainees outside the
framework of the UCMJ and without the benefit of the protections of the
Third Geneva Convention.58
When many of the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle are assembled under
a new era of government transparency, the picture will be clearer. Certainly
when many of the officers who either explicitly or silently opposed the
practice have retired and are freed from command influence, new disclo-
sures will cast greater light on the present situation. 9
Shortly after this Administration institutionalized a policy of per-
missible torture in violation of the above-mentioned legal obligations, tor-
ture was practiced in various international arenas such as: the U.S. military
bases at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Bagram, Kandahar and other locations in
54 See Memorandum from Colin L. Powell, Sec'y of State, U.S. Dep't of State to Alberto
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26, 2002), re-
printed in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3, at 122.
55 See Mora Memo, supra note 50.
56 See Memorandum from William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State to Al-
berto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Comments on Your Paper on the Geneva Con-
vention (Feb. 2, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3, at 129.
57 Brief for Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Rasul. v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
58 Id. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, supra note 2.
59 For example, Sergeant Anthony Lagouranis, who left the service July 2005, writes in a
New York Times Op-Ed piece that he and other interrogators have been placed in the posi-
tion of using dogs to "enhance" interrogation, as well as using hypothermia. He lays the
blame on Col. Thomas Pappas, the senior intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib, working under
the command of Major General Jeffrey Miller, who was transferred to Abu Ghraib from
Guantanamo. Lagouranis clearly says that his superiors purposely made the rules muddy and
unclear, and that they did so with a way to avoiding responsibility. He points to the trial of
two other army sergeants, namely Santos Cardona and Michael Smith, who also used dogs to
intimidate and who are now facing court martial. General Miller, according to Lagouranis,
took the Fifth Amendment in refusing to appear as a witness in the case of the two sergeants
who claim that they were acting under superior orders, which they apparently also did not
feel were "manifestly unlawful." If that were the case under the UCMJ and international
humanitarian law, they would have the obligation to refuse to carry out such an order. See
Anthony Lagouranis, Tortured Logic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006; Stephen Grey, CIA Prison-
ers "Tortured" in Arab Jails, BBC NEWS, Feb. 8, 2005.
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Afghanistan; Abu Ghraib and other location in Iraq; and through proxies in
a number of countries, including Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Romania, and Po-
land (based on publicly available information as of now).60 The latter sub-
terfuge, namely, using the CIA to kidnap non-U.S. nationals for delivery to
other governments' secret services for torture, assurances and denials not-
withstanding, are nonetheless crimes under any one or more of the sources
of law mentioned above that prohibit torture.
6
'
It should be noted that the official justification for the above-
described policy and practices is the so-called "War on Terrorism"--a term
developed and given content by the Administration. It became the backdrop
against which these domestic and international crimes were committed with
62impunity. However, international law does not provide any exception to
the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention or the CAT, and neither
do relevant U.S. laws under the UCMJ and Title 18.63
Many of the 200 persons estimated to have died in U.S. military
custody have purposely not been autopsied by the militaryra-some even
died several months ago-presumably so as not to require investigations
into their deaths and further proceedings in accordance with the UCMJ if
such an autopsy report confirmed the conclusions of those death certificates
that indicated death as a result of physical mistreatment. Even though the
word torture is not specifically used in these death certificates, by inference,
sometimes more clearly stated than in others, the deaths were attributed to
trauma caused by severe beatings and organ failures. 65 So far, not a single
case has been charged under the war crimes provisions of the UCMJ, and to
this writer's knowledge, not a single case has been investigated, charged, or
prosecuted as torture or as a homicide resulting from intentional infliction of
serious bodily harm amounting to torture. A court martial of a Non-
Commissioned Officer ("NCO") for the killing of an Iraqi general at Abu
Ghraib by means of stuffing him in a sleeping bag and sitting on his chest
during interrogation, resulted in the conviction of the Chief Warrant Officer,
who committed the act. 66 Notwithstanding the charges of negligent homi-
cide and negligent dereliction of duty, which carries a modest penalty of up
60 See infra notes 59 and 84.
61 See supra notes 19-21.
62 See the various contributions by noted jurists contained in Symposium, Terrorism on
Trial, 36 CASE W. RES. U. J. INT'L L. 1 (2004).
63 See Geneva III, supra note 18 (particularly Article 17); CAT, supra note 6; Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000).
64 See supra note 4.
65 See Bybee Memo, supra note 33; see also supra note 33.
66 See Eric Schmitt, Army Interrogator is Convicted of Negligent Homicide in 2003 Death
oflraqi General, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at A16; see also Josh White, U.S. Army Officer
Convicted in Death ofIraqi Detainee, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at A2.
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to three years and three months in prison, the NCO faced no jail time, was
restricted to his barracks for sixty days, or payment of $6,000 in fines.67
Lest it is not obvious from the above description, the Chief Warrant Officer
was found guilty of negligent homicide, a charge much less severe than
what he should have been charged with under the UCMJ's articles of war,
for having killed a prisoner of war in his custody. Even so, the guilty NCO
basically walked out of Fort Carlson, Colorado a free man.
The number of inquiries and courts martial remains sparse, and
tracking these cases is difficult because none of the branches of the military
record the statistics regarding the grounds for courts martial and other forms
of disciplinary proceedings, thus making it difficult to follow the specific
reasons for the inquiry, investigation, or disciplinary action.
The relatively limited number of inquiries, investigations, discipli-
nary proceedings and courts martial, estimated at over 120 cases, could well
be intended to present to the public what is tantamount to yet another fig
leaf of plausible deniability by the highest level of civilian and military
leadership to protect them from future criminal responsibility. These limited
actions are intended to show that when the facts are discovered, the civilian
and military leadership carry out their legal obligations to investigate and
prosecute where the facts so require. But in none of these cases, except for
some disciplinary actions, did these investigations and inquiries go above
those immediately involved and upwards into the chain of command. Those
who got caught were usually enlisted personnel and NCOs. They are at the
bottom of the ladder. There is no known case where an officer was court
martialed for dereliction of duty or on the basis of command responsibility.
Certainly those in the upper levels of the chain of command were spared the
ignominy of investigation and discipline. 6
67 See Schmitt, supra note 66; White, supra note 66.
68 With the death of an estimated 200 persons as a likely result of torture and a well-
established and documented pattern of institutionalized practice of torture in Camp Delta in
Guantanamo Bay and in various detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, the command
influence of the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense and also, presumably, ema-
nating from the White House, could amount to a cover-up of crimes in violation of U.S. laws.
If this were to be true, then it would justify articles of impeachment against the President and
the Vice President for what the Constitution refers to as "high crimes and misdemeanors."
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
A lawsuit by the ACLU and Human Rights First charge Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld with direct responsibility for torture and abuse of detainees, in particular of eight per-
sons. See Complaint, Ali v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-CV-01201, 2005 WL 922428 (N.D.IlI. Mar. 1,
2005), available at http://humanrightsfirst.com////uslaw/etn/lawsuit/PDF/rums-complaint-
022805.pdf. Because Rumsfeld is directly under the chain of command of the President, his
responsibility could be imputed to his Commander in Chief. The ACLU has also filed suit
against the CIA for the kidnapping and torture of a person based on so-called extraordinary
rendition. See Complaint, EI-Masri v. Tenet (E.D. Va. 2005), available at http://www.aclu.or
g/images/extraordinaryrendition/asset_upload file829_22211 .pdf. If the CIA Director is
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Perhaps if the military justice system had been more thorough in
United States v. Calley during the Vietnam era this would not have hap-
pened. 69 The 1968 My Lai Massacre of over 500 innocent civilians resulted
only in Lieutenant Calley's prosecution and conviction, which was followed
by a Presidential pardon by President Richard Nixon.7° Calley's immediate
superior, Captain Medina, was acquitted, 71 and the regimental Commander,
Colonel Henderson, was only administratively disciplined. However, even
in Calley's case, the court martial charges were not under the UCMJ's Arti-
cles of War.
The law of command responsibility brooks no question that when
military commanders in the chain of command issue orders or are aware of
the practices of torture and fail to prevent the commission of such a crime,
they are personally responsible.73 The same applies when they discover
these crimes and fail to investigate them and prosecute those responsible for
the deeds, including those in the chain of command if the evidence warrants
it.74 Moreover, it imposes upon these commanders the obligation to prevent
the recurrences of these violations. Lastly, the obligation to investigate and
prosecute is not conditioned upon the public's discovery of violations. As
seen clearly in the Abu Ghraib case, no charges were brought against any
known violators within the military prior to the horrifying pictures becom-
found responsible, his actions could also be attributed to his Commander in Chief For more
information about the first set of lawsuits against the Secretary of Defense, Lt. General Ri-
cardo Sanchez, Brigadier General Karpinski, and Thomas Pappas, all filed in U.S. District
Court the District of Columbia, see ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/rumsfeld/index.htm
1. For more information about the ACLU suit against former CIA Director George Tenet,
filed in the U.S District for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, see ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/extraordinaryrendition/index.html.
69 United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); Calley vs. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1975). See also THE My LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF THE
LAW (Joseph Goldstein et al. eds., 1976); Jordan J. Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms,
Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REV. 99 (1972) [hereinafter Paust, My Lai and
Vietnam].
70 See THE MY LAI MASSACRE AND ITS COVER-UP: BEYOND THE REACH OF THE LAW, supra
note 69; see also Paust, My Lai and Vietnam, supra note 69.
71 Medina v. Resor, 43 CMR 243 (1971).
72 See Paust, My Lai and Vietnam, supra note 69.
73 See supra note 53 on command responsibility.
74 Mark Swanner, a CIA official who interrogated an Iraqi detainee at Abu Ghraib, is
believed to have been charged with homicide by a confidential report of the CIA Inspector
General. See Jane Mayer, A Deadly Interrogation: Can the C.IA. Legally Kill a Prisoner?,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 14, 2005. It is reported that this information was sent for possible crimi-
nal charges to Paul McNulty, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia-the
location of CIA headquarters-but for over a year, nothing has been acted upon. In October,
2005, President Bush nominated McNulty to the position of Deputy Attorney General. It has
now been more than two years since the Iraqi detainee in question was killed. See id.
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ing public on American television. In fact, it appears that senior officers
who investigated prison conditions in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and
Iraq, like General Taguba, all reported in one way or another that torture or
something similar was taking place.75 These reports were mostly classified.
The civilian and military commanders who ordered the classifying of these
reports therefore had notice of the violations, and are themselves responsi-
ble, first, for failure to act in the face of these reports, and second, for con-
cealing these reports to prevent legal action in keeping with the require-
ments of the law.
The command influence from the highest echelons of the Depart-
ment of Defense not only appears to have allowed the practice of torture but
encouraged it through laxity of command oversight. It has also permeated
the military establishment in the form of disincentives for those officers
75 See ANTHONY R. JONES & GEORGE R. FAY, INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AT ABU GHRAIB (2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/dod/fay82504rpt
.pdf; INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION, THE
MIKOLASHEK REPORT (July 21, 2004) at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ArmyIGDe-
taineeAbuse/DAIG%20Detainee%200perations%20Inspection%20Report.pdf; ANTONIO M.
TAGUBA, MAJOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH
MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 3, at 405; JAMES
R. SCHLESINGER, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO
REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 80 (2004) at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug20
04/d20040824finalreport.pdf; See generally DANNER, supra note 5. For another detailed
study of the paper trail on illegal interrogation tactics and involvement of both military and
civilians starting in October 2002 through the memorandum of Major General Michael B.
Dunlavey, Commander of Joint Task Force 170, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, parts of which
were ultimately approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of
Defense, see Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations, supra note 2 at 838-55. More re-
cently, it was disclosed by the Boston Globe:
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld closely monitored the late 2002 interroga-
tion of a key Guantanamo Bay prison detainee at the same time that the prisoner
was subjected to treatment that a military investigator later called "degrading and
abusive," according to newly released documents
The documents, portions of a December 2005 Army inspector general report, dis-
closed for the first time that Rumsfeld spoke weekly with the Guantanamo com-
mander, Major Geoffrey Miller, about the progress of the interrogation of a Saudi
man suspected of a connection to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
The intense attention Rumsfeld and Miller were paying to the interrogation raises
new questions about their later claims that they knew nothing about the tactics in-
terrogators used, which included a range of physically intense and sexually humili-
ating techniques similar to those in the Abu Ghraib torture scandal in Iraq.
Over a six-week period, according to subsequent investigations, the detainee was
subjected to sleep deprivation, stripped naked, forced to wear women's underwear
on his head, denied bathroom access until he urinated on himself, threatened with
snarling dogs, and forced to perform tricks on a dog leash, among other things.
Charlie Savage, Documents Link Rumsfeld to Prisoner's Interrogation, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
15, 2006.
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76
who would not allow or encourage such illegal practices. Conversely,
those who did were incentivized, as in the case of now Major General
Jacoby, whose report on Afghanistan was made at the time he was Brigadier
General. 7 It is believed that his originally drafted report was at least critical
of the interrogation techniques conducted there, but that he subsequently
amended it. The report was classified and never released, and the author
was promoted to Major General and assigned to a post in Alaska. The
command influence has also taken a more blatant turn with the Secretary of
Defense recently inserting himself between promotion boards and Congress,
which makes such appointments.78 This had not been the case until now.
Some active military personnel, like Captain Ian Fishback, have
demonstrated courage in revealing the existence of these practices to their
superiors, and, in the case of Fishback, when these superiors failed to act, he
went public with his knowledge and revealed it to Congress. 79 Regrettably,
there are too few officers who have done so.
By the standards of command responsibility, either under interna-
tional humanitarian law or under the UCMJ, those in the chain of command
up to and including the Secretary of Defense, or, for that matter, possibly
also the President, may have committed international crimes as well as
crimes under the laws of the United States. Whether they are responsible or
not is a question that may never be answered unless justice establishes it.
76 When the Abu Ghraib story broke, the commanding officer was Brigadier General Jane
Karpinski, a reserve Army officer who was then demoted to Colonel. For all practical pur-
poses, she took the fall for General Ricardo Sanchez, who was the senior U.S. Field Com-
maider. General Karpinski in several interviews reported that she was targeted to take the
fall not only because she was a reserve officer, but also because she was a woman. While it is
not possible to make the connection between Karpinski's demotion and its impact on other
women in the military, it is nonetheless noteworthy as reported in the Alberto Mora memo-
randum that Captain Jane Dalton, Legal Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and Lt. Col. Diane Beaver, apparently failed to take positions opposing torture and/or prac-
tices similar to torture. A pattern of command influence and/or intimidation can therefore be
seen at different levels. See Mora Memo, supra note 50; see also Abu Ghraib Whistleblower
Testifies About Government Retaliation Before Congress, 84 U.S. LAW AND SECURITY
DIGEST, Feb. 17, 2006. See also supra note 59.
77 A United Nations report refers to the Jacoby report. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], Comm. On Human Rights, Report of the Independent Expert on the Situation of
Human Rights in Afghanistan, M. CherifBassiouni, 45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/122 (Mar.
11, 2005) [hereinafter Report of the Independent Expert]. Jacoby's promotion to Major Gen-
eral and command assignment in Alaska was not publicized in the same way as other promo-
tions. See DOD News: General Officer Announcements (Oct. 29, 2004), http://www.defense
link.mil/releases/2004/nr20041029-1453.html.
78 It was recently announced that all board recommendations for general officers from
Major General and above must first secure the Secretary of Defense's approval before being
sent to Congress.
79 Letter From Ian Fishback, Captain, U.S. Dep't of the Army to Senator John McCain
(Sept. 16, 2005), reprinted in A Matter of Honor, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2005, at A2 1.
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However, there are surely enough questions by now that any further action
in support of the policy and practices leading to torture cannot be answered
by claims of ignorance. The fig leaf is off.
TORTURE INVOLVING OTHER U.S. OFFICIALS AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS
Institutionalized torture has not only taken place in a military con-
text or at the hands of the military, but has also been carried out by two ad-
ditional categories of operatives: members of the CIA and civilian contrac-
tors of the Department of Defense. These operatives have been reported to
have engaged directly or indirectly in torture.80 They engaged directly in
torture by performing the acts themselves, and indirectly, by having others
engage in acts of torture, either at their behest or for their benefit and with
knowledge or foreseeability. At the outset, it should be noted that neither
the CIA, FBI, or any other person working for the U.S. government is ex-
empt from the CAT. The same applies to Department of Defense ("DoD")
civilian contractors.
CIA personnel have been engaged in interrogations in Guantanamo
Bay, Iraq (Abu Ghraib and other detention facilities), and Afghanistan (Ba-
gram, Kandahar, and other free-fire bases). 81 A legalistic interpretation of
U.S. law would be that they are not subject to the UCMJ, although they
accompanied U.S. military forces and operated on U.S. bases. However,
under the PATRIOT Act, Federal criminal law applies to U.S. bases abroad
and to actions by U.S. citizens abroad.82 Violations of the CAT also apply
to acts committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. 83
Another artful technique employed by the CIA is the resort to the
euphemistically termed practice of "extraordinary rendition." This appar-
ently means the kidnapping, sequestration, and transfer of non-U.S. nation-
als and their physical delivery to governments whose secret services engage
in the torture of these individuals in order to obtain information of interest
80 See Report of the Independent Expert, supra note 77, at 16-17.
81 The CIA's Inspector General, John L. Helgerson, is reported to have issued a classified
report in 2004. The New York Times reported: "A classified report issued last year by the
Central Intelligence Agency's inspector general warned that interrogation procedures ap-
proved by the C.I.A. after the Sept. 11 attacks might violate some provisions of the interna-
tional Convention Against Torture, current and former intelligence officials say. The previ-
ously undisclosed findings from the report, which was completed in the spring of 2004,
reflected deep unease within the C.I.A. about the interrogation procedures, the officials said."
Douglas Jehl, Report Warned C.L.A. on Tactics in Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005,
at Al.
82 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 804,
115 Stat. 272, 377 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(9)(A) (2001)).
83 CAT, supra note 6.
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to the CIA. 84 Like the techniques described above, this one is intended to
take advantage of the jurisdictional loopholes in Title 18 criminal violations
by selecting victims who are not U.S. citizens, kidnapping them outside the
territory of the U.S., and delivering them to yet another state. Moreover, by
not directly involving any U.S. official in the torture, plausible deniability is
advanced by the CIA. If it is possible to establish a connection in terms of
knowledge or reasonable foreseeability between the CIA agents who deliver
such victims to foreign government agents and the subsequent torture by
these governments, then clearly these CIA agents have committed an inter-
national crime under the CAT and can be prosecuted under this convention
in any country that can exercise jurisdiction over them. They could also be
prosecuted under the UCMJ. As early as 1994, Congress, pursuant to the
CAT, criminalized torture even when committed outside the territory of the
United States. 85 How the government lawyers mentioned above were able
to simply argue that the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station is under Cuban
sovereignty and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. was at best a
fantastic argument, particularly when the position of the U.S. for years has
been that Cuba does not have sovereignty over that base, so long as the U.S.
occupies it.
86
It should also be noted that kidnapping and transferring of persons
from one country to another, even though occurring outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the U.S., is almost always likely to occur within the territorial
jurisdiction of another state. Since kidnapping is a crime under the laws of
all countries of the world, and since many countries have ratified the CAT
or have provisions within their criminal laws criminalizing torture, actions
by CIA operatives, as well as by private contractors, would constitute a
crime under the laws of the state where the kidnapping or torture took place.
This was the case in Italy where CIA agents kidnapped an Egyptian cleric in
the city of Milan, and surrendered him to Egyptian police authorities where
84 See Grey, supra note 59 (providing comments by Michael Scheuer, a twenty-two year
veteran of the CIA, on the rendition practices of the CIA). In February, 2006, the House
International Relations Committee of Congress defeated three resolutions which would have
required investigations into these practices. JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2006).
For kidnapping as a substitute to lawful extradition, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 217-93 (3d ed. 1996). But
see United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (upholding the notion of mala
captus bene detentus). The Supreme Court, however, subsequently upheld Alvarez-
Machain's right to file an action under the Alien Tort Claims Act, and to obtain damages for
the kidnapping. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
I" 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a) (2000) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 30, 1994, § 506(a), 108
Stat. 382, 463).
86 That argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Rasul. v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004).
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he has been detained and tortured for over a year.87 When these actions
were discovered, the Milan Prosecutors indicted thirteen CIA operatives
who worked out of Italy.88 An international arrest warrant was issued
against them, and an extradition request to the U.S. for their surrender is
pending. 89 There are also investigations being conducted by the Council of
Europe, which referred to the practice of the U.S. as the "'outsourcing' of
torture," 90 as well as by several governments in connection with the unau-
thorized use of their territory for purposes of "extraordinary rendition," as
well as possibly for locations where interrogations with torture may have
taken place. Surely all of this evidences the unlawful nature of the activity,
placing the United States in the embarrassing position of being caught in the
commission of officially-sanctioned criminal activity that may also be tan-
tamount to the infringement of the sovereignty of other states. In any event,
it exposes CIA agents to criminal responsibility under the laws of foreign
countries when they were acting pursuant to orders from their own govern-
ment, believing them to be lawful. If such agents are prosecuted in a foreign
country, their defense will be that they followed the orders of their superi-
ors, which were based on the legal advice of U.S. government lawyers. If
the legal opinions of these government lawyers were to be presented to a
foreign criminal court, it would hardly withstand the scrutiny of an average
judge or prosecutor. For this advice to induce the CIA to send its agents to
engage in kidnappings overseas, landing in different countries for re-
fueling, holding kidnapped persons on foreign soil, using force and possibly
even torture, and delivering them to an ultimate destination country for the
ostensible purpose of coercive interrogation, including torture, is irresponsi-
ble, to say the least. How can any legal advisor opine that a member of the
CIA can engage in a crime in the territory of another country and not be
subject to its criminal jurisdiction? If that was not part of the explicit legal
advice given to the CIA, then it is unimaginable how senior officials in that
agency would put their agents, U.S. citizens serving their country, in harm's
87 John Crewdson of the Chicago Tribune was the most thorough journalist investigating
this story. See John Crewdson, Italy: CIA Email Ties Agents to Abduction, CHI. TRIB., Jan.
20, 2006; John Crewdson & Alessandra Maggiorani, Italians Press for Extradition of CIA
Agents, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 11, 2005; see also Italy Seeks Arrests in Kidnapping Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A5.
88 Crewdson, supra note 87; Crewdson & Maggiorani, supra note 87; Italy Seeks Arrests
in Kidnapping Case, supra note 87.
89 Crewdson, supra note 87; Crewdson & Maggiorani, supra note 87; Italy Seeks Arrests
in Kidnapping Case, supra note 87.
90 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, (Jan. 22, 2006),
available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2006/20060124.._JdocO32006 E.pdf. See
also Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at
Al.
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way. Not only were the providers of legal advice in this case misleading
their superiors, but they have as a result of it placed CIA agents in positions
of having violated the laws of other countries, as well as their own. 91
The other category of possible violators of U.S. and international
law is DoD private contractors doing paramilitary work. Private contracting
for paramilitary work is a recent invention of the U.S. that seems to fly in
the face of the United Nations International Convention against the Re-
cruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, which prohibits the
use of mercenaries whenever private contractors are used in a military, pa-
91 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 114 states: "Whoever, within the special maritime and territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States and with the intent to torture [as defined in § 2340],
maim, disfigure, bite, cuts or slits the nose, ear, or lip or cuts out or disables the tongue, or
puts out or destroys an eye, or cuts off or disables a limb, or any member of another person;
or [w]hoever... with like intent, throws or pours upon another person any scalding water,
corrosive acid, or caustic substance [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than twenty years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 114 (2000). See also 18 U.S.C. § Il I(c)(6) (2000).
There is also civil liability for torture under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which
also defines torture in a manner consistent with the CAT and with 18 U.S.C. § 2340. See
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). There have
been a number of cases under the Torture Victim Protection Act establishing liability for its
perpetrators. It should also be noted that the Alien Tort Claims Act provides for a civil rem-
edy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Importantly, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 as amended in 1996, specifically states that torture is an exception to the immunity of a
foreign state from prosecution or adjudication before a U.S. Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)
(2000). Lastly, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1988 grants the Secre-
tary of State the power not to surrender by means of extradition or by other means a person
to a country where he/she is likely to be tortured in violation of the CAT. Foreign Affairs
Reform and Restructuring Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 822
(1998). See also Department of State regulations on the subject which include a definition of
torture at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2006). There have been a number of cases by several
circuits dealing with that issue, all of which have the former Attorney General Ashcroft as a
defendant. See e.g., Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2003); AI-Najjar v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 1262 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F.Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
Lastly, the Torture Victim Relief Act of 1998 defines torture in much the same terms as Title
18 U.S.C. § 2340, and authorizes the president to provide grants for the rehabilitation for the
victims of torture. 22 U.S.C. § 2152 (2000).
Further evidencing the President and the administration's awareness of the prohibition of
torture even in connection with other matters, as if intending to prepare an eventual defense
against institutionalized torture, is the inclusion of a specific provision on torture in U.S.
legislation signed by the President on May 11, 2005: It is the bill for emergency supplemen-
tal appropriations for defense, the global war on terror, and tsunami relief for the fiscal year
ending Sept. 20, 2005, in which s 6057(a)(1) provides "None of the funds appropriated or
otherwise made available by this Act shall be obligated or expended to subject any person in
the custody or under physical control of the United States to torture, or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, The Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, H.R. Res. 1268, 109th Cong. § 6057(a)(1) (2005). Sec-
tion 6057(b)(1) further refers to the definition of torture as contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2340.
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ramilitary, or supportive military capacity. 92 Thus, in and of itself, the use
of such personnel in these capacities may also be a violation of international
law. Because such personnel operate on U.S. military bases abroad and
alongside the military, it is hard to maintain that there is no agency relation-
ship to DoD. It is also possible that they may be deemed accompanying
personnel for purposes of UCMJ applicability. In order to prevent that re-
sult, the contracts between the Department of Defense and such private en-
terprises are couched in clever legal terms that define the latter as independ-
ent contractors not subject to the military. This also means that they are not
subject to the command and control structure of the military on a given base
nor are they part of the structure of the Department of Defense. They oper-
ate pursuant to contracts administered by a special office under civilian con-
trol and answerable to the civilian Secretary of Defense and the civilian
Under-Secretary of Defense. Thus, by an artful use of contract law, a new
category of operatives who may engage in military and paramilitary activi-
ties remain outside military command and control and also beyond the reach
of the UCMJ.
Under Title 18, there is no general extra-territorial criminal provi-
sion, and the principle of nationality in respect to criminal jurisdiction does
not exist except with respect to some limited provisions such as treason,
espionage, and tax evasion. 93 This legal stratagem is akin to that of the cor-
porate veil in business law. However, jurisprudence in corporate criminal
responsibility has established that the corporate veil cannot be used to con-
ceal conspiracies and crimes. 94 If the appropriate case were to be brought
before a conscientious and courageous judge, it would be likely that this
corporate veil would be lifted, and those belonging to the offending private
contractors could be found subject to the UCMJ's jurisdiction or alterna-
tively subject to Title 18 criminal jurisdiction for torture and conspiracy to
commit torture.
It should be noted that the UCMJ would apply to civilian contrac-
tors if Congress declared war and if such contractors would operate along-
side the U.S. military overseas. 95 However, it should also be noted that the
Department of Justice may proceed under Title 18 pursuant to the Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA"), which was adopted in 2000 to
92 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 72nd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989).
93 18 U.S.C. (2000).
94 See Note, Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227 (1979); CORPORATE AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME:
AN ANTHOLOGY (Leonard Orland ed., 1995). For state law see JOHN F. DECKER, ILLINOIS
CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES §§ 3.25-3.27 (3d ed. 2000).
95 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000).
2006]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
close the jurisdictional gap over civilians operating alongside military forces
outside the United States. 96 However, MEJA is dependent for its application
on the procedural guidelines issued by the Department of Defense in
2005.97 Under these purposefully drawn complex procedures, it has been
impossible for the Department of Justice to prosecute any civilian contractor
irrespective of what the crime may have been. Part of the legal evasion
scheme has also been to assign the interrogation of detainees, which in-
cludes the use of torture, to contractors operating under an award by a fed-
eral agency other than the Department of Defense. As a result, MEJA and
the Department of Defense regulations mentioned above would not apply to
such non- Department of Defense contractors. It should also be noted that
MEJA only applies to crimes committed outside the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., 98 which, presumably, would make it ap-
plicable to such locations as Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, Iraq and any-
where else that interrogations are conducted in a manner that may be
deemed torture. It should be noted that the PATRIOT Act expanded the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. to include, "premises
of any diplomatic, consular, military, or other United States government
missions or entities in foreign states, including the buildings, part of the
buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, or used for the purposes
of these missions or entities, irrespective of ownership." 99 This means that
all the locations mentioned above can be deemed part of the territorial juris-
diction of the U.S., and, thus, these locations are no longer outside the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the U.S. for purposes of MEJA's jurisdictional applica-
tion. Through this jurisdictional gimmick, civilian contractors evade any
and all forms of criminal responsibility for their conduct abroad, no matter
what crimes they may commit.
NOTICE OF TORTURE
Congress, at the urging of many leading Senators, including Sena-
tors John McCain and Richard Durbin, adopted a resolution which the
House of Representatives endorsed, urging enforcement of U.S. law prohib-
96 See Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
97 See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 5525.11, CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
EMPLOYED BY OR ACCOMPANYING TIE ARMED FORCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES,
CERTAIN SERVICE MEMBERS, AND FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS (Mar. 3, 2005).
98 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (2000).
99 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 804, 115
Stat. 272, 377 (2001) (emphasis added). I am grateful to Lt. Col. Michael Newton for his
views to me on MEJA.
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iting torture.' 00 The seemingly innocuous resolution urged no more than
following U.S. law, more particularly, requiring the military to follow their
own field manuals and other regulations and procedures, and closes the ju-
risdictional gap with respect to private contractors and CIA operatives in
respect to overseas torture. 101 One would think that no congressional action
is needed to remind the Administration, particularly the civilian leadership
in the Department of Defense, that they should apply U.S. law and military
regulations. Surprisingly, this simple re-statement of existing law was chal-
lenged. The President at first threatened to veto a bill containing such lan-
guage, the Vice President lobbied strongly against it, and the Administration
and the Congressional Republican leadership also sought to eliminate or
change that language. 102 When in the end the text was adopted, the Presi-
dent, in a brazen and insensitive manner, announced that, in essence, he
would continue to do what he is doing if he felt that it was in the best inter-
ests of the United States. 103 If there is anything indicating notice that there
100 President Bush signed into law H.R. 2863, the Department of Defense Emergency Sup-
plemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico and Pandemic Influ-
enza Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005). Title 10 of Division A of the
Act is the detainee Treatment Act of 2005, commonly referred to as the "McCain Amend-
ment." §§ 1001-1006. That text does not use the term torture. It merely provides that those in
the custody or control of the Department of Defense shall be subject only to interrogation
techniques included in the U.S. Army Field Manual. § 1002(a). Section 1003(a) specifically
states that no individual in the custody of the U.S. government shall be subject to cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment. Quite clearly, the government lawyers whose
opinions the Administration relied upon had disregarded or ignored the plain language and
meaning of that U.S. Army Field Manual. In signing the Bill, President Bush issued a state-
ment calling into question the legislation's binding effect. The statement says that the Ad-
ministration will construe the Detainee Treatment Act "in a manner consistent with the Con-
stitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary Executive Branch and as Com-
mander in Chief, and consistent with the Constitutional limitations on the judicial power."
Press Release, White House, President's Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, the "Depart-
ment of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the
Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html. In that statement, the
President not only challenges the binding effect of the legislation, but also challenges the
judicial branch in questioning his interpretation. Id. In short, the President clearly indicates
that he is neither bound by legislation, nor by judicial decision, irrespective of what the Con-
stitution provides. See id. The President, obviously on the advice of government lawyers, that
Presidential powers in time of war, as defined by the President and not by virtue of a Con-
gressional Declaration of War as provided for by the Constitution, has absolute powers
which neither Congress nor the Supreme Court can limit.
101 Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes
in the Gulf of Mexico and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat.
2680 (2005).
102 See Eric Schmitt, House Defies Bush and Backs McCain on Detainee Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005.
103 "The executive branch shall construe provisions in the Act ... in a manner consistent
with the President's constitutional authority .... See Press Release, White House, Presi-
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is a practice that violates both U.S. law and international law, and that such
a practice should be discontinued, one would think of nothing more public
than the adoption of this language as part of the Defense Appropriation Bill,
as well as the debates and lobbying efforts surrounding it.
It is hard to believe that if the senior officials of this Administration
were ever to be called to the Bar of justice for the policy and practices of
torture that they could argue lack of notice or that they did not know that
what they were doing was deemed by many to be unlawful.
The patterns of deceit, command influence, concealment, derelic-
tion of duty to investigate and prosecute, intentional disregard of legal obli-
gations, as well as elaborate schemes to evade the application of the law,
have been recognized in many cases of criminal responsibility under Title
18 with respect to conspiracy to commit white collar crimes and violent
crimes. Why the legal subterfuges discussed above have escaped legal scru-
tiny, both within the military and civilian systems of justice, has no other
explanation except for the fact that the operators of these two systems of
justice have looked the other way. Admittedly, it is not easy for military or
civilian prosecutors to go against their superiors all the way up the chain of
command to the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, or, for that
matter, the President to carry out legal and ethical obligations. The day may
come when additional facts will become public knowledge, and when those
who were intimidated or who felt their career interests were too much at
stake to fulfill their moral and legal obligations will feel safe in revealing
what happened-what then? One word first comes to mind, and it is shame.
THE MORAL IMPERATIVE OVERLOOKED
This country, which has long struggled for the establishment of the
rule of law and has long sought to be a model for other nations in observing
the rule of law, will perhaps one day find itself faced with these abhorrent
practices that it could never have imagined having taken place within such a
climate of public indifference. Time and again, observers of tragic historic
events reveal that it is not so much the evil doing of a few that allows the
worst atrocities to occur but that it is the indifference of the many. In time,
when all of the facts are disclosed, future generations of Americans, and
certainly non-Americans who have historically regarded America as a moral
leader beating the pathway for human rights, will wonder why the organized
Bar failed to rise up in arms against institutionalized torture, why the organ-
ized Bar failed to even investigate for possible ethical violations those law-
dent's Statement on H.R. 3010, the "Department of Labor, Heath and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006" (Dec. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-6.html; Charlie Savage, Bush
Could Bypass New Torture Ban, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2006.
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yers who have written memos justifying torture, why the defenders of hu-
man and civil rights did not demonstrate against these practices as they did
in the 1960s, and why the media failed to show greater indignation and pur-
sue these stories with more determination as they have done so frequently in
the past. Lastly, what has happened to America in the last few years for its
people to turn a blind eye to institutional torture, worse yet, to tolerate it and
be indifferent to it? To their credit, organizations like Human Rights Watch,
Human Rights First, and the ACLU have been at the forefront of raising the
issues contained in this essay as evidenced by their reports and the legal
action brought by Human Rights First and the ACLU. 1
04
Martin Niemoller, a Protestant minister who lived through the Nazi
period, wrote this personal confession:
First they came for the Communists, but I was not a Communist, so I said
nothing. Then they came for the Social Democrats, but I was not a Social
Democrat, so I did nothing. Then came the trade unionists, but I was not a
trade unionist. And then they came for the Jews, but I was not a Jew, so I
did little. Then when they came for me, there was no one left who could
stand up for me.105
Today, Americans are in the same position as the Reverend Niemoller was
at one time, but have not reached the point of admission. For most Ameri-
cans, the claim is that they came for the alleged terrorists, and I was not a
terrorist, so I did nothing. Little did they know that so many among the al-
leged terrorists were not terrorists and that, potentially, so many innocent
persons, both Americans and non-Americans, wound up being arbitrarily
arrested and detained, as well as tortured, in violation of everything that we
have held secularly sacred in our legal system, namely, our Constitution,
our treaties, and our laws.
The history of dictatorships has always started with a slippery slope,
where one erosion of the rule of law leads to another and where the general
public accepts these erosions because of the motivation of fear that such
governments have mastered. For sure, we are not at that point, but if we are
to avoid slipping, we must stay away from the scope's edge. Early on in the
history of this republic, Benjamin Franklin noted that "those who would
give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety, deserve nei-
i04 See supra note 68. A most significant contribution was made by an online magazine,
Salon.com, which obtained through the Freedom of Information Act information going back
to late 2002, and which continues to consistently disclose reports, pictures, and documents on
this issue. The New York Times, the Washington Post and the New Yorker magazine have
also been consistent in continuing to cover this unfolding story.
105 The Quotations Page, Quotations Details: Martin Niemoller, http://www.quotationspage
.com/quote/2961 1.html. "This quote is most often attributed to Niemoller, but its exact
source and wording is varied." Frank Dunham, Where Hamdi Meets Moussaoui in the War
on Terror, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 839, 839 n.3 (2005).
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ther liberty nor safety."' 106 In a similar vein, Thomas Paine, another great
American patriot of our founding period, reminded us that "those who ex-
pect to reap the blessing of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of
supporting it.' 0 7 By that he meant that they must also undergo the sacri-
fices that are necessary to uphold our values.
A Personal Testimony
In 1957, I was placed in house arrest in Egypt, in part for having
stepped up to government officials against the deportation of one of my
former professors and his family, who was Jewish, as well as another Jew-
ish family friend. In addition, I had stood up against the expropriation of a
Jewish family's property. 0 8 What may have been the last straw was my
vocal and forceful denunciation of torture when I saw the picture of a mem-
ber of the Muslim Brotherhood who had been tortured to death. Even
though I was a young man, my voice carried because of my prominent fam-
ily background, but also because I had fought in the 1956 War and received
the medal of military valor, a fact that was publicized by the media. At the
age of 20, the self-deluding belief of youthful invincibility carried me to do
things that good judgment would have prevented. Having raised too much
protest with too many officials I was placed in house arrest with the explicit
threat that I would likely either be tortured or killed. During house arrest in
my apartment in Cairo the shutters were nailed, telephone and radio cut off,
and food delivered once a day. I had no contact with the outside world, and
lived with the constant fear of being taken to an interrogation center where I
would be subject to the types of torture that I had protested. My living space
shrank to my bedroom and then to my bed, where I spent most of my time
in a fetal position, jumping at the slightest noise. I understood firsthand
what psychological torture meant. Some seven months later I was released
and tried to resume normal life, but lived with this trauma for a long time,
and even today I have to admit to its lingering effects. I am grateful to God
for having spared me the experience of physical torture, and have vowed
since then to do everything I could to eliminate this inhuman and abhorrent
practice. From 1977-1978, I was given this opportunity when I was named
co-chair, along with the late Niall MacDermott of the International Com-
mission of Jurists, of the Committee of Experts which prepared the first
draft of the Convention Against Torture. That text, which I had the honor of
106 Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor, Nov. 11, 1755, in 6
THE PAPERS OF BENiAMIN FRANKLIN 242 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1963). This quote is
inscribed on the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty.
107 Attributed to Thomas Paine, Sept. 12, 1777.
108 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Bearing Witness, in PIONEERS OF GENOCIDE STUDIES 315, 355
(Samuel Totten & Steven Leonard Jacobs eds., 2002).
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drafting, was first submitted in 1978 to the Sub-Commission on the Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, which in turn forwarded
it to the Commission on Human Rights.109 The text was then re-introduced
by Sweden, whose representative served as a member of the Committee of
Experts, as did representatives from The Netherlands and Austria who were
the principal governments supporting the adoption of a convention. To my
great satisfaction, many of the provisions of the text I prepared in 1977,
including the definition of torture, were embodied in the 1984 CAT. Again,
God was gracious to me when he allowed the circle to close by allowing me
to contribute to the world's anti-torture effort.
During the Committee of Experts' work at the International Institute
for Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa, Italy), a member of the
Committee of Experts from one of the Permanent Five asked me privately
one late evening what would I do, since I urged an absolute prohibition
against all forms of infliction of physical harm, if I knew that a bomb was
about to go off in a building with the potential of killing 10,000 persons.
Would I torture the person who knew where the bomb had been placed?
Since he was not from the Common Law system, I brought to his attention a
well-known American legal maxim that "hard facts make bad law." The
facts in this hypothetical, I told him, were hard, and they should not be re-
lied upon to make a law which addresses a wide variety of factual patterns
that cannot be based exclusively on extreme possibilities or highly improb-
able ones. He pressed me for an answer, and I admitted to him that if I knew
for a fact that this person could, with reasonable certainty, help in discover-
ing the whereabouts of the bomb, and, thus, that I could save 10,000 lives,
that I would either acquiesce to or do whatever was necessary, up to and
including torture, to obtain the information. He smiled as if having scored a
victory, at which point I added that I would then write a full report and turn
myself in to the authorities for having committed a crime. Hopefully, I
added, the judge would be lenient and take into account my motive, even
though I had broken the law and committed a crime. 110
When I took the oath of citizenship in 1967, I fervently believed
that the Constitution was the greatest barrier against tyranny and that noth-
ing like what I endured in my beloved native country could happen in the
U.S. because of its adherence to the rule of law. That evening, a special
ceremony was held for the some 1,200 newly-naturalized citizens and their
109 See supra note 32.
110 This represents the theory of just desert, and also reflects the philosophy of natural law.
See generally LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987). This view has also
been represented in connection with civil disobedience and other forms of breaches of the
law whereby the person who violates the law has to assume responsibility. For a discussion
of the moral considerations in the "ticking bomb" scenario, see David Luban, Liberalism,
Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425 (2005).
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families. The Citizenship Council of Metropolitan Chicago had selected me
as the "Outstanding New Citizen of the Year," and I was to deliver a speech
before this gathering of some 5,000 persons, including the city's civic lead-
ers and many members of the Bench and Bar. My speech was on the rule of
law, the difference between democracy and tyranny, and between civiliza-
tion and barbarism. That is what America meant to me.
The problem with this Administration is that it assumes neither
moral nor legal responsibility, and in the end, it is hard-put to show what
positive results it may have obtained for so many transgressions.
So far we know that at least 200 people may have died under tor-
ture, and that, cumulatively, thousands of persons may have been tortured in
Guantanamo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere."1 ' Yet it seems that none of
these cases resemble the extreme hypothetical posed to me in the example
above. And yet, I cannot help but think of another highly-regarded aca-
demic, Alan Dershowitz, who advocates torture only because some extreme
case might justify the means. 112 The history of law and legal institutions has
1 The Department of Defense and other government agencies have purposely not kept
cumulative records of numbers of persons detained in publicly known facilities, as well as in
secret detention facilities. There have been periodic media reports based on publicly avail-
able information of numbers of detainees held in some facilities such as Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo. Sometimes the numbers have been consistent over a period of times, such as
Guantanamo. At others, such as Abu Ghraib, the numbers related to a certain period of time.
No one has ever put together the bits and pieces of information released by the government,
however, by collecting numbers from various media reports, it appears that in Iraq the num-
ber of persons detained for a period of over 24 hours may well have exceeded 100,000. Since
physical mistreatment has been common, if one accepts the definition of torture under Article
17 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 1 of the CAT, then it is reasonable to conserva-
tively extrapolate a projected number of no fewer than 10,000 persons tortured in Iraq.
112 See ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (2002); Alan Dershowitz, Is There a
Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at M4; Alan Dershowitz, Want to
Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19. This represents a primal re-
tributive view, whereby justification for torture is found in retribution for the acts of the
perpetrator. This, of course, presupposes having certainty that the person tortured is the per-
petrator of a particularly heinous crime which is likely to cause harm to a large number of
persons. This view also combines the utilitarian approach which is devoid of social moral
significance, that is, the social moral significance of torture in the name of a society purport-
ing to uphold higher values. Taken to its logical extent, this view would re-introduce torture
as a form of punishment for abhorrent crimes as was practiced in the middle ages. See JOHN
H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF (1977). Dershowitz does not, however,
address the implications of such a practice on the character of the society engaging in it, nor
in the consequences that it would have on perpetrators of terrorism who could then find
legitimacy in the acts of torture as a way of further perpetrating such crimes. See M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Terrorism: The Persistent Dilemma of Legitimacy, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
299, 303 (2004). A different view is taken by Judge Richard Posner, who considers that
torture under some conditions may benefit from the defense of necessity, even though neces-
sity in criminal law has never been a defense for the acts of another. Moreover, he departs
from an objective definition of torture to make it a subjective one. He states that torture be-
gins at "the point along a continuum at which the observers' queasiness turns to revulsion."
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for all too long proven to us the error of accepting the Machiavellian princi-
ple that the ends justify the means.
I will conclude this presentation with a related personal story that
happened in Egypt in 1956 during the so-called "Sinai War." I was a second
lieutenant assigned to a camp in downtown Cairo, and on that night I was
the duty officer with a small detail of ten men within the camp and a few
guards. Sometime around 23:00, I heard a commotion on the street outside
the camp and went out to check, asking the two guards on duty what was
happening. They told me that an Israeli pilot had parachuted behind the
camp, his white chute having been observed by persons who then cried out
to others, and a crowd was gathering to capture him. Knowing that this
meant that he would be hacked to death, I instinctively rushed back inside,
gathered the ten men under my command, ordered them to carry weapons,
and ran out to try and find the pilot before the crowd did. Fortunately, it
turned out to be a rumor. The parachute was a white bed sheet that had been
left on a rooftop to dry, and had flown off appearing at a distance to be a
parachute. As I ended my duty the next morning, I found myself in trouble
for having left my post and had to plead with my commanding officer that if
his son were in that same situation in Tel Aviv, he would have wanted a unit
of the Israeli army to save him. It was not only a matter of humanity, but for
the military it was also a matter of honor. Many years later, after the Camp
David Accords of 1978, in which I had some involvement, I recounted the
story to the late general Abrasha Tamir, then Director General of Prime
Minister Menachen Begin's office, who became a friend and with whom I
subsequently worked with on Middle East affairs for several years. General
Tamir's reply was that one of the reasons why it had been so easy for Israel
to make peace with Egypt was because none of its POWs had been tortured
or killed by the Egyptian military. Of all the utilitarian arguments in favor
of humanitarian treatment of POWs, this one struck me the most.
I shudder at the thought that American military personnel may fall
in the hands of someone like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his violent ji-
hadists in Iraq, or in the hands of some violent Taliban group in Afghani-
stan, or, for that matter, in the hands of any Al Qaeda-affiliated group any-
where in the world, who would torture them. Will their answer to pleas not
to torture our detainees be that they are doing nothing more than what the
U.S. has been doing? What to say then? That they are barbarians and that
we are not?
Torture is a crime under the Geneva Conventions, the CAT, and
under U.S. law. 13 It is an outrage on human decency. Its institutionalized
Richard A. Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in ToRTURE: A COLLECTION 291
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
113 Geneva I, supra note 18; Geneva II, supra note 18; Geneva III, supra note 18; Geneva
IV, supra note 18; CAT, supra note 6; 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000).
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practice undermines the integrity of the American legal process and our
system of law, and its depravity undermines our moral leadership in the
world. It lends credibility, if not legitimacy, to the violent acts of the anti-
American jihadists. Moreover, it seldom produces reliable information. Un-
der torture, most people would say anything the interrogators wanted.
Lastly, each person tortured, as well as his/her family, are likely to become
enemies of the U.S. and seek revenge for their treatment, thus generating
more potential enemies likely to threaten the security of this country and its
people.
The fact that so much of what has happened was the result of a few
jurists using their talents to serve the political interests of those whose legal
and moral sensitivities were not strong enough to resist the temptation of
resorting to torture will surely discredit our legal profession. As stated
above, when the full scope of what has happened is revealed, how will we
as a nation explain our indifference to such an outrage? Shame will be the
least of the consequences we will reap from the commission of what will
surely prove to be senseless and useless crimes.
Almost on a daily basis, stories about torture are reported which re-
inforce the element of knowledge that the Administration has, and its obli-
gation to investigate, and where appropriate, to prosecute. Rather than doing
that, it contents itself with public relations responses to the effect that these
are old stories. Discovery of new facts about what may be an old story has
nothing to do with the criminality of what occurred and the obligation to
pursue it. To avoid legal obligations by equaling them with media relations
responses is not only disingenuous, but it confirms the dereliction of duty.
Torture is not only morally and legally wrong, it is counter-
productive. To denounce it is not unpatriotic-it is patriotic, because it is
the right thing to do.
As General Douglas MacArthur said in his farewell speech to the
corps of cadets at West Point, May 12, 1962:
The code which those words perpetuate embraces the highest moral laws
and will stand the test of any ethics or philosophies ever promulgated for
the uplift of mankind. Its requirements are for the things that are right, and
its restraints are from the things that are wrong.
Others will debate the controversial issues, national and international,
which divide men's minds; but serene, calm, aloof, you stand as the Na-
tion's war-guardian, as its lifeguard from the raging tides of international
conflict, as its gladiator in the arena of battle.
For a century and a half you have defended, guarded and protected its hal-
lowed traditions of liberty and freedom, of right and justice.
... These great national problems are not for your professional participa-
tion or military solution. Your guidepost stands out like a ten-fold beacon
in the night: Duty, Honor, Country.
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... The Long Gray Line has never failed us. Were you to do so, a million
ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from
their white crosses thundering those magic words: Duty, Honor,
Country. 114
If, as stated by the President in his State of the Union message
quoted at the top of this article, this Administration is to "determine the
character of our country" with the policy and practices described above, l 15
then this nation is likely to find itself on the same slippery slope that
brought about a decline of democracy and erosion of the rule of law that
other countries have experienced before plunging into dictatorship. Before
re-determining the character of this country, which hardly needs it, perhaps
this Administration should be reminded of the wise words of George Santa-
yana, "those who do not remember the past are condemned to repeat it. 
1 16
114 Douglas MacArthur, Gen., Thayer Award Acceptance Address (May 12, 1962), avail-
able at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html.
115 Bush, State of the Union Address, supra note 1.
116 GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON (1905).
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